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1. Introduction
Consider	an	utterance	of	 ‘Fish	sticks	are	tasty’	as	made	by	a	speaker	
who	likes	fish	sticks.	How	will	the	speaker	assess	this	claim	when,	at	
some	later	point	 in	her	 life,	she	comes	to	dislike	fish	sticks?	As	true	
or	as	false?	Will	she	retract	her	earlier	statement	or	stand	by	it?	More	
generally,	will	she	use	her	present	taste	standard	in	assessing	the	claim	
or	the	standard	she	had	at	the	time	of	the	original	utterance?	The	an-
swer	to	this	question	is	of	vital	importance	for	the	recent	discussion	on	
the	semantics	and	pragmatics	of	so-called	“predicates	of	personal	taste”	
(e.g.	“tasty”	and	“fun”).
The	two	major	contenders	for	a	semantics	of	predicates	of	personal	
taste	 are	 relativism	 and	 contextualism.	Although	 these	 views	make	
similar	predictions	in	many	cases,	they	crucially	come	apart	when	it	
comes	to	the	indicated	types	of	situations.	Relativism	predicts	that	the	
speaker’s	assessment	will	depend	on	her	 later	taste	standard,	 that	 is,	
the	taste	standard	governing	the	so-called	“context	of	assessment”	(e.g.	
Kölbel,	2003;	Lasersohn,	2005;	Stephenson,	2007;	MacFarlane,	2014;	
Egan,	2014;	Dinges,	2017).	Meanwhile,	contextualism	predicts	that	the	
speaker’s	assessment	will	depend	on	her	original	taste	standard,	that	is,	
the	taste	standard	governing	the	so-called	“context	of	use”	(e.g.	Glanz-
berg,	 2007;	 Stojanovic,	 2007;	 López	 de	 Sa,	 2008;	Moltmann,	 2010;	
Schaffer,	 2011;	 Sundell,	 2011;	 Huvenes,	 2012;	 Plunkett	 and	 Sundell,	
2013;	Pearson,	2013;	Marques,	2014;	Zakkou,	2019).	
Which	prediction	is	borne	out	by	the	data?	Both	relativists	and	con-
textualists	typically	take	the	data	to	favor	their	position.	MacFarlane	
(2014:	141),	for	instance,	holds	that	
speakers	will	retract	(rather	than	stand	by)	an	earlier	as-
sertion	 that	 something	was	 tasty,	 if	 the	flavor	 the	 thing	
had	at	 the	 time	of	 the	assertion	 is	not	pleasing	 to	 their	
present	 tastes	—	even	if	 it	was	pleasing	to	the	tastes	they	
had	then.
Raffman	(2016)	disagrees.	She	“would	have	no	inclination	to	retract”	
and	 suggests	 that	 “our	 intuitions	 are	 sufficiently	 divergent,	 and/or	
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Part I: Gathering the data
2. Relativism and Contextualism 
In	this	section,	we’ll	explain	relativism	and	contextualism	and	where	
they	 come	 apart.	We’ll	 be	 using	 a	 semantics	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	Kaplan	
(1989)	and	Lewis	(1981).	We	will	thus	assume	that	sentences	express	
propositions	at	a	given	context	of	use	and	that	these	propositions	have	
truth-values	relative	to	a	circumstance	of	evaluation,	that	is,	a	tuple	of	
parameters	including,	e.g.,	a	possible	world	or	a	point	in	time.1
According	 to	 relativism,	 sentences	 of	 the	 form	 ‘F	 is/isn’t	 tasty’	 in-
variably	express	the	same	proposition	independently	of	the	context	in	
which	they	are	used.	We	can	refer	to	the	respective	proposition	simply	
as	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty.2	The	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	
tasty	 isn’t	 just	expressed	by	 the	 sentences	 in	question,	according	 to	
relativism;	 it	 also	 features	 as	 the	object	 of	 assertion.	Thus,	 you	will	
assert	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	when	you	assertively	use	the	sentence	‘F	is/
isn’t	tasty’	 in	a	given	context.	For	economy	of	expression,	we’ll	refer	
to	the	proposition	a	speaker	asserts	when	she	assertively	uses	a	given	
sentence	 as	 the	 proposition	 the sentence asserts.	 Relativists	 are	 thus	
committed	to	the	following	principle:
R1.	The	proposition	asserted	by	 ‘F	 is/isn’t	 tasty’	 in	a	giv-
en	context	κ	(invariably)	is	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	
tasty.
Relativists	 hold	 further	 that	 this	 invariably	 asserted	 proposition	
has	truth-values	only	relative	to	what	we’ll	call	a	taste standard.	More	
specifically,	they	propose	to	add	a	taste	standard	to	the	circumstance	
1.	 We	will	 spend	 considerable	 effort	 on	 clarifying	where	 relativism	 and	 con-
textualism	come	apart	because	it	has	been	argued	(influentially)	that	these	
views	are	just	notational	variants	of	one	another	(e.g.	Stojanovic,	2007).	We	
want	to	dispel	any	such	concern.
2.	 We	are	simplifying	here,	glossing	over	sources	of	context-sensitivity	such	as	
sensitivity	to	a	contextual	threshold	for	tastiness	(e.g.	Glanzberg,	2007:	9)	or	
context-sensitivity	 in	 the	 term	replacing	 “F”.	This	 should	be	unproblematic	
because	all	our	example	cases	hold	respective	context	factors	fixed.	
simply	 anemic,	 that	 MacFarlane’s	 constructed	 examples	 cannot	 al-
ways	bear	the	weight	he	places	on	them”	(Raffman,	2016:	172).	Indeed,	
relativist	claims	about	ordinary	intuitions	have	been	challenged	with	
experimental	data	in	discussions	of	epistemic	modals	(e.g.	Knobe	and	
Yalcin,	2014;	Marques,	2018)	and,	more	recently,	predicates	of	personal	
taste	(Kneer,	ms).
Part	 I	 of	 our	 paper	 aims	 to	 clarify	 how	ordinary	 speakers	 actual-
ly	respond	to	the	relevant	 type	of	cases,	 focusing	specifically	on	the	
predicate	“tasty”	as	one	prominent	predicate	of	personal	taste.	We	ex-
plain	where	contextualism	and	relativism	come	apart	(§2)	and	suggest	
a	general	paradigm	to	test	the	respective	predictions	(§3).	We	present	
experiments	constructed	within	the	suggested	paradigm	(§4)	and	end	
with	a	brief	summary	of	the	discussion	so	far	(§5).	Our	experiments	
converge	on	two	interesting	findings.	First,	ordinary	speaker	intuitions	
are	just	as	split	as	the	intuitions	of	the	reported	philosophers.	Second,	
whether	ordinary	speakers	have	 relativist	or	contextualist	 intuitions	
depends	on	the	direction	in	which	they	change	their	taste.	They	are	
more	inclined	to	assess	previous	taste	claims	as	false	when	they	start	
out	disliking	the	food	in	question	than	when	they	start	out	liking	it.
Part	II	of	our	paper	aims	to	make	sense	of	this	data.	We	propose	
what	we	call	hybrid	relativism	to	explain	why	ordinary	speaker	judg-
ments	about	the	relevant	cases	are	split	between	relativism	and	con-
textualism	(§6).	The	idea	will	be	that	taste	claims	have	both	a	relativist	
and	 a	 contextualist	 reading	 and	 that	 people	 respond	 differently	 de-
pending	on	which	reading	they	happen	to	select.	We	then	address	the	
indicated	direction	effect	(§7).	The	suggestion	here	will	be	that	people	
are	more	 inclined	to	 favor	 the	relativist	 reading	when	they	start	out	
disliking	 the	 food	 in	question	due	 to	 an	 independent	preference	 to	
interpret	speakers	negatively.	We	address	some	alternative	candidate	
accounts	of	the	data	(§8)	before	we	conclude	(§9).
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truth	norm.	Again,	the	truth	norm	can	be	spelled	out	in	different	ways.	
We’ll	use	a	so-called	“reflexive”	 implementation	that	 ties	 the	permis-
sibility	of	assertions	to	one’s	present	context:
R3.	One	is	permitted	to	assert	that	p	in	a	context	κ	iff	the	
proposition	that	p	is	true	relative	to	the	circumstance	of	
evaluation	determined	by	κ.
Take	again	the	proposition	that	licorice	is	tasty.	Whether	you	are	per-
mitted	to	assert	that	proposition	will	depend	on	your	current	context	
and	which	circumstance	of	evaluation	it	determines.	Assume	that	the	
circumstance	determined	by	your	context	is	<t*,s+>.	Then	you	will	be	
permitted	to	assert	that	licorice	is	tasty	because	this	proposition	is	true	
relative	to	<t*,s+>.
So	far,	we’ve	characterized	the	general	outlines	of	a	relativist	frame-
work.	One	crucial	element	 is	missing,	namely,	an	account	of	how	a	
context	 determines	 a	 circumstance	 of	 evaluation	 <t,s>	 as	 required	
in	R3.	The	determination	of	the	point	in	time,	t,	 in	<t,s>	is	relatively	
straightforward.	The	time	of	a	context	of	assertion	will	simply	be	the	
time	at	which	the	assertion	is	made.	But	how	does	a	context	determine	
a	taste	standard?	Different	versions	of	relativism	say	different	things	
here.5
What	we	call	simple	relativism	answers	the	question	as	follows:
R-SIMP.	The	 taste	 standard	determined	by	 a	 given	 con-
text	is	the	taste	standard	that	the	speaker	of	that	context	
has	at	the	time	of	the	context.6
Suppose	you	assert	at	t*	that	licorice	is	tasty	and	that	you	happen	to	
like	licorice,	that	is,	that	your	taste	standard	is	s+.	By	R-SIMP,	the	cir-
cumstance	of	your	context	will	be	<t*,s+>.	This	means	that,	by	R3,	your	
5.	 Note	that	the	idea	of	a	context	determining	a	circumstance	is	already	present	
in	Kaplan’s	(1989:	522)	work	when	he	speaks	of	“the	circumstance	of	the	con-
text”	(our	emphasis)	(see	also	MacFarlane,	2014:	77).
6.	 See	Kölbel	(2008:	19)	and	MacFarlane	(2014:	143–144)	for	further	discussion	
of	the	idea	of	a	taste	standard	and	the	idea	of	having	a	certain	taste	standard.	
See	also	Dinges	and	Zakkou	(2020).
of	evaluation	and	argue	that	the	truth-value	of	the	proposition	that	F	
is/isn’t	tasty	depends	on	what	the	taste	standard	happens	to	be.3	For	
simplicity,	we	will	ignore	all	parameters	in	the	circumstance	of	evalu-
ation	beyond	the	point	in	time	and	the	newly	added	taste	standard.4 
We’ll	use	the	notation	<t,s>	to	refer	to	the	circumstance	of	evaluation	
comprising	the	point	in	time,	t,	and	the	taste	standard,	s.	Against	this	
background,	a	relativist	can	characterize	the	indicated	dependency	of	
truth-values	on	taste	standards	as	follows.
R2.	The	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	is	true	relative	to	
<t,s>	iff,	at	t,	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	the	lights	of	s.
To	illustrate,	take	the	proposition	that	licorice	is	tasty.	Let	t*	stand	for	
a	given	point	in	time,	s+	for	a	taste	standard	by	the	lights	of	which	lico-
rice	(as	it	tastes	at	t*)	is	tasty,	and	s-	for	a	taste	standard	by	the	lights	
of	which	licorice	(as	it	tastes	at	t*)	is	not	tasty.	On	these	assumptions,	
the	proposition	that	licorice	is	tasty	is	true	relative	to	<t*,s+>	but	false	
relative	to	<t*,s->.
Following	MacFarlane	(2014),	we’ll	assume	that	semantic	theories	
of	 the	 type	 above	make	 predictions	 about	 our	 ordinary	 use	 of	 lan-
guage	by	way	of	the	norms	governing	speech	acts.	There	are	different	
types	of	speech	acts	one	might	consider	here.	We’ll	focus	on	assertions	
in	 this	paper.	With	respect	 to	assertions,	 there	are	different	 types	of	
norms	one	might	 invoke.	The	most	prominent	 candidates	 are	 truth,	
justification,	and	knowledge	norms.	For	concreteness,	we’ll	assume	a	
3.	 Some	 relativists	add	a	 taste	 standard	 to	 the	circumstance	of	evaluation,	as	
we	do,	while	others	add	a	 judge.	We	 focus	on	 the	 former	version	because	
we	think	it’s	better	equipped	to	make	sense	of	the	data	we’ll	report	below.	In	
particular,	 relativists	using	a	 judge	parameter	have	a	hard	 time	explaining	
why	we	would	ever	want	to	say	that	a	previous	taste	claim	“was”	false	after	we	
have	changed	our	taste	standard.	Relativists	using	a	standards	parameter	can	
make	sense	of	this.	More	on	this	below.	See	also	MacFarlane	(2014:	162–165)	
for	discussion	of	the	differences	between	the	indicated	versions	of	relativism.
4.	 Relativists	don’t	have	to	include	a	point	in	time	in	the	circumstance	of	evalu-
ation.	Whether	they	include	this	parameter	depends	on	whether	they	have	
“temporalist”	or	“eternalist”	leanings	(Richard,	1981).	We	chose	a	temporalist	
(i.e.	time	relative)	framework	because	it	makes	some	of	the	subsequent	dis-
cussion	easier	to	follow.	Nothing	of	substance	should	depend	on	this	choice.
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of	evaluation.	According	to	contextualism,	this	parameter	can	simply	
be	dropped.	Given	the	previous	simplifications,	we	can	thus	construe	
a	circumstance	of	evaluation	as	comprising	just	a	point	in	time,	and	
we	can	offer	the	following,	unsurprising	truth-conditions	for	the	just-
indicated	contextualist	propositions.
C2.	The	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	the	lights	of	s	is	
true	relative	to	<t>	iff,	at	t,	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	the	lights	of	s.
As	before	in	the	case	of	relativism,	we’ll	additionally	assume	that	con-
textualists	want	 to	 link	 their	 semantics	 to	ordinary	usage	via	 the	al-
ready	familiar	reflexive	truth	norm	of	assertion.
C3	(=	R3).	One	is	permitted	to	assert	that	p	in	a	context	
κ	 iff	the	proposition	that	p	is	true	relative	to	the	circum-
stance	of	evaluation	determined	by	κ.
Suppose,	 for	 instance,	 that	 you	 assertively	utter	 ‘Licorice	 is	 tasty’	 at	
t*.	According	 to	C1,	 you	will	 thereby	 assert	 that	 licorice	 is	 tasty	 by	
the	 lights	of	 the	 taste	 standard	determined	by	 your	 current	 context.	
Assume	that	this	taste	standard	is	s+.	Then,	the	assertion	will	be	per-
missible	given	C3	because	the	proposition	that	licorice	is	tasty	by	the	
lights	of	s+	is	true	relative	to	<t*>.
These	are	the	basic	outlines	of	a	contextualist	theory.	Note	that	the	
determination	relation	described	in	C3	will	no	longer	raise	eyebrows	
in	 a	 contextualist	 framework	where	 the	 circumstance	 of	 evaluation	
comprises	 just	a	point	 in	time.	As	 indicated,	 the	point	 in	time	deter-
mined	by	a	given	context	of	assertion	plausibly	is	the	time	of	the	asser-
tion.	But	contextualists	make	use	of	a	context	determining	a	taste	stan-
dard	in	their	assumption	C1.	Just	like	in	the	case	of	relativism,	one	may	
wonder	how	this	determination	relation	is	supposed	to	be	cashed	out.
Simple contextualism	offers	a	simple	account,	which	mirrors	the	re-
spective	assumption	of	simple	relativism.
assertion	is	permissible	because	the	proposition	that	licorice	is	tasty	is	
true	relative	to	<t*,s+>.	The	assertion	would	have	been	impermissible	
if	you	hadn’t	liked	licorice	and	hence	your	taste	standard	had	been	s-.
Flexible	versions	of	relativism	assume	more	flexible	determination	
relations.	They	might	 say	 that	 the	 taste	 standard	of	 a	 given	 context	
is	the	taste	standard	of	an	idealized	version	of	the	speaker,	the	taste	
standard	of	the	most	salient	subject	in	the	conversation,	the	taste	stan-
dard	of	a	salient	group	of	people	such	as	the	speaker	and	her	audience,	
etc.	By	R3,	such	views	would	 imply	 that	you	are	permitted	 to	assert	
that	licorice	is	tasty	in	a	context	κ	iff	an	idealized	version	of	yourself,	
the	most	salient	person	in	the	conversation,	or	you	and	your	audience	
like	licorice.	We’ll	leave	such	versions	of	relativism	aside	for	now	and	
come	back	to	them	later.7
Contextualism,	in	contrast	to	relativism,	has	it	that	sentences	of	the	
form	 ‘F	 is/isn’t	 tasty’	 express	 different	 propositions	 at	 different	 con-
texts	of	use.	We	can	generically	refer	to	the	proposition	expressed	in	
a	given	context	κ	as	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by the lights of 
the taste standard determined by κ.8	Contextualists	 think	 that	 these	ex-
pressed	propositions	typically	feature	as	the	objects	of	assertion.	They	
are	thus	committed	to	the	following	principle:
C1.	The	proposition	asserted	by	‘F	is/isn’t	tasty’	 in	a	giv-
en	context	κ	is	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	the	
lights	of	the	taste	standard	determined	by	κ.
Contextualists	 hold	 that,	 given	 the	 new	 flexibility	 in	 the	 asserted	
proposition,	we	no	longer	need	a	taste	standard	in	the	circumstance	
7.	 One	might	complain	that	relativism	as	defined	here	is	not	actually	relativism	
but	“non-indexical	contextualism”	(see	e.g.	MacFarlane,	2009	for	this	distinc-
tion).	Note,	however,	 that	 the	difference	between	genuine	(or	assessment)	
relativism	 and	 non-indexical	 contextualism	 is	 standardly	 assumed	 to	 be	
purely	technical	as	long	as	we	consider	only	the	speech	act	of	assertion	and	
leave	retraction	aside	(see	e.g.	Kölbel,	2015b).	We	will	leave	retraction	aside,	
so	there	is	no	need	to	use	the	technically	more	complex	assessment-sensitive	
framework.
8.	 The	considerations	from	footnote	2	apply	mutatis mutandis.
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For	instance,	suppose	I	say,	“We	should	go”,	and	thereby	assert	that	we	
should	go.	When	I	later	ask	whether	you	agree	with	“what	I	said”,	I	will	
refer	to	the	asserted	proposition	that	we	should	go	according	to	REF.9 
The	second	assumption	 is	 that	 the	semantics	of	sentences	of	 the	
form	‘P	was	true’	is	governed	by	principles	along	the	following	lines.
T1.	The	proposition	asserted	by	‘P	was	true/false’	in	a	giv-
en	context	κ	is	the	proposition	that	P	was	true/false.
T2.	The	proposition	that	P	was	true/false	is	true	relative	
to	<t,s>	iff,	for	some	time	t’	prior	to	t,	P	is	true/false	rela-
tive	to	<t’,s>.
T1	 says	 that	 sentences	 like	 ‘P	was	 true/false’	 invariably	 express	 the	
same	proposition.	T2	offers	deflationary	truth-conditions	for	the	pred-
icate	‘was	true’,	where	this	predicate	basically	shifts	the	point	in	time	
relative	to	which	the	embedded	proposition	is	evaluated.	(Note	that	T1	
and	T2	assume	a	relativist	framework	where	circumstances	of	evalua-
tion	comprise	a	point	in	time	and	a	taste	standard.	We	can	simply	drop	
the	reference	to	taste	standards	in	order	to	align	the	principles	with	
contextualism.)
A	full	defense	of	REF,	T1,	and	T2	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	this	pa-
per,	but	we	hope	these	principles	are	plausible	enough	to	be	taken	for	
granted	for	now.	With	these	principles	in	place,	we	can	derive	compet-
ing	verdicts	from	our	initial	definitions	of	simple	relativism	and	simple	
contextualism	when	it	comes	to	assertions	of	‘What	X	said	was	true/
false’.
Suppose,	for	instance,	that	Hannah	assertively	used	‘Fish	sticks	are	
tasty’	 in	a	context	κ1.	Suppose	she	assesses	 this	assertion	 later	on	 in	
κ2	by	asserting	“What	I	said	was	true”.	Under	what	conditions	will	the	
assertion	in	κ2	be	permitted?	Relativism	entails	that	the	permissibility	
of	Hannah’s	assertion	is	tied	to	her	taste	standard	in	κ2.	Contextualism	
entails	that	it	is	tied	to	her	taste	standard	in	κ1.	Here	is	why.
9.	 See	e.g.	Kölbel	(2008:	15;	2009:	392;	2015b)	and	Khoo	and	Phillips	(2019:	312)	
for	a	similar	assumption	in	a	related	context.
C-SIMP	(=	R-SIMP).	The	taste	standard	determined	by	a	
given	context	is	the	taste	standard	that	the	speaker	of	that	
context	has	at	the	time	of	the	context.
To	illustrate,	assume	that	you	like	licorice	and	hence	have	the	taste	
standard	s+.	You	assertively	utter	‘Licorice	is	tasty’	at	t*.	According	to	
C1	and	C-SIMP,	you	thereby	assert	that	licorice	is	tasty	by	the	lights	
of	s+.	This	proposition	is	true	relative	to	<t*>	given	C2,	and	hence	the	
assertion	is	permissible	given	C3.	The	assertion	would	have	been	im-
permissible	if	you	hadn’t	liked	licorice	and	hence	your	taste	standard	
had	been	s-.
Flexible	versions	of	contextualism	have	more	complicated	stories	to	
tell.	On	such	views,	the	taste	standard	of	a	context	could	again	be	that	
of	an	idealized	version	of	the	speaker,	the	most	salient	subject,	or	a	sa-
lient	group.	As	before	in	the	case	of	relativism,	we’ll	stick	with	simple	
contextualism	for	now	and	return	to	more	complicated	views	later.
Given	how	simple	relativism	and	simple	contextualism	have	been	
defined,	it	may	be	hard	to	see	how	they	could	conflict.	For	instance,	on	
both	theories,	it	is	permissible	to	assertively	use	‘Licorice	is	tasty’	at	a	
given	context	iff	licorice	is	tasty	by	one’s	own	lights.	Indeed,	the	condi-
tions	for	permissible	assertions	of	plain	“tasty”	sentences	are	the	same	
according	to	simple	relativism	and	simple	contextualism.
To	tear	the	positions	apart,	we	need	to	look	at	other	types	of	sen-
tences.	The	sentences	we	want	to	look	at	in	what	follows	are	sentences	
of	the	form	‘What	X	said	was	true/false’.	Simple	relativism	and	simple	
contextualism	yield	competing	verdicts	here.	To	make	this	clear,	two	
assumptions	are	required.
The	first	assumption	is	this:
REF.	Expressions	of	the	form	‘what	X	said’	are	normally	
used	to	refer	to	the	objects	of	assertions,	that	is,	the	prop-
osition	we	assert	when	we	make	an	assertion.
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depends	solely	on	 this	earlier	 taste	standard.	Her	present	 taste	stan-
dard	at	κ2	doesn’t	matter.
Generalizing	a	bit,	we	arrive	at	competing	verdicts	for	the	follow-
ing	 types	 of	 scenarios,	where	 a	 speaker	 changes	 her	 taste	 standard	
over	time:
Σ1.	In	κ1,	F	is	tasty	by	the	lights	of	S’s	taste	standard.	Cor-
respondingly,	S	asserts	“F	is	tasty”.	In	κ2,	S’s	taste	standard	
has	changed	so	that	F	is	no	longer	tasty	by	the	lights	of	S’s	
taste	standard.
Σ2.	 In	 κ1,	 F	 isn’t	 tasty	 by	 the	 lights	 of	 S’s	 taste	 standard.	
Correspondingly,	 S	 asserts	 “F	 isn’t	 tasty”.	 In	κ2,	 S’s	 taste	
standard	has	changed	so	that	F	is	now	tasty	by	the	lights	
of	S’s	taste	standard.
Simple	relativist	verdict	about	Σ1	and	Σ2:
In	κ2,	it	is	permissible	for	S	to	assert	“What	I	said	was	false”	
and	impermissible	to	assert	“What	I	said	was	true”.
Simple	contextualist	verdict	about	Σ1	and	Σ2:
In	κ2,	it	is	permissible	for	S	to	assert	“What	I	said	was	true”	
and	impermissible	to	assert	“What	I	said	was	false”.
This	 concludes	our	presentation	of	 relativism	and	 contextualism.	
We	have	presented	simple	versions	of	each	of	 these	positions.	They	
agree	that	the	taste	standard	of	a	given	context	is	the	taste	standard	
that	the	speaker	of	the	context	has	at	the	time	of	the	context.	By	way	of	
this	agreement,	they	make	widely	similar	predictions.	The	views	come	
apart	though	when	it	comes	to	truth-value	assessment	of	previously	
asserted	contents.
This	is	not	the	only	place	where	the	views	come	apart.	They	can	nat-
urally	be	spelled	out	to	make	competing	predictions	for	when	speak-
ers	disagree	(e.g.	MacFarlane,	2014:	ch.	6),	when	they	should	retract	
Consider	 relativism	 first.	 According	 to	 relativism,	 and	 the	 asser-
tion	norm	R3	in	particular,	the	assertion	in	κ2	will	be	permitted	iff	the	
asserted	proposition	is	true	relative	to	the	circumstance	<t2,s2>	deter-
mined	by	κ2.	To	assess	whether	this	condition	holds,	we	first	have	to	
get	clear	on	what	proposition	Hannah	asserted	at	κ2.	By	T1,	this	will	
simply	be	 the	proposition	 that what Hannah said was true.	 The	ques-
tion	now	is	whether	this	proposition	is	true	relative	to	<t2,s2>.	Given	
REF,	 ‘what	Hannah	said’	 refers	 to	 the	proposition	she	previously	as-
serted.	According	to	relativism,	and	R1	in	particular,	 the	proposition	
Hannah	previously	asserted	is	the	proposition	that fish sticks are tasty.	
The	proposition	that what Hannah asserted was true	should	thus	be	true	
relative	to	<t2,s2>	iff	the	proposition	that the proposition that fish sticks 
are tasty was true	is	true	relative	to	<t2,s2>.	By	T2,	this	condition	holds	iff,	
for	some	time	t1	prior	to	t2,	the	proposition	that fish sticks are tasty	is	true	
relative	to	<t1,s2>.	According	to	R2,	this	condition	is	met	iff,	at	t1,	fish	
sticks	are	tasty	by	the	lights	of	s2.	According	to	R-SIMP,	s2	is	the	taste	
standard	Hannah	has	at	the	context	κ2.	Thus,	the	permissibility	of	her	
assertion	of	‘What	I	said	was	true’	at	κ2	depends	on	her	taste	standard	
at	κ2.	The	assertion	will	be	permissible	only	if	she	likes	fish	sticks	at	κ2.
Consider	contextualism	next.	According	to	the	contextualist	norm	
of	assertion	C3,	Hannah’s	assertion	 in	κ2	will	be	permitted	 iff	 the	as-
serted	proposition	is	true	relative	to	the	circumstance	<t2>	determined	
by	κ2.	Given	the	principle	T1,	the	asserted	proposition	will	again	be	the	
proposition	that what Hannah said was true.	Given	REF	and	the	contex-
tualist	assumption	C1,	‘what	she	said’	refers	to	the	proposition	that fish 
sticks are tasty by the lights of the taste standard s1 determined by κ1.	Thus,	
the	proposition	that what Hannah said was true	should	be	true	relative	
to	<t2>	iff	the	proposition	that the proposition that fish sticks are tasty by 
the lights of s1 was true	is	true	relative	to	<t2>.	According	to	T2,	this	con-
dition	holds	 iff,	 for	 some	 time	 t1	prior	 to	 t2,	 the	proposition	 that fish 
sticks are tasty by the lights of s1	is	true	relative	to	<t1>.	According	to	C2,	
this	condition	in	turn	is	met	iff,	at	t1,	fish	sticks	are	tasty	by	the	lights	of	
s1.	C-SIMP	now	has	it	that	s1	simply	is	the	taste	standard	Hannah	has	
at	 the	context	κ1.	This	means	 that	 the	permissibility	of	her	assertion	
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In	light	of	this	worry,	we	want	to	suggest	a	different	strategy	to	test	
the	 indicated	verdicts,	 if	only	 for	 the	purposes	of	methodological	di-
versity.	The	basic	idea	will	be	to	look	at	what	people	judge	they	would 
say	in	a	given	context	rather	than	what	they	judge	is permissible to say.	
Take	 the	 verdicts	 derived	 from	 relativism	 and	 contextualism.	 They	
don’t	directly	entail	predictions	about	what	people	judge	they	would	
say.	But	we	can	derive	such	predictions	in	two	steps.
First,	norms	of	speech,	and	the	norm	of	assertion	more	specifically,	
are	supposed	to	govern	our	linguistic	behavior.	So	assuming	that	the	
norms	are	correct,	we	would	expect	respective	permissibility	facts	to	
be	 reflected	 in	our	 speech	behavior.	 In	particular,	we	would	 expect	
that,	other	things	being	equal,	people	prefer	permissible	over	imper-
missible	assertions.	Other	things	being	equal,	relativism	thus	predicts	
that,	if	people	found	themselves	in	scenarios	like	Σ1	and	Σ2,	they	would	
assess	their	previous	claim	as	false	(‘What	I	said	was	false’)	rather	than	
true	(‘What	I	said	was	true’).	Meanwhile,	contextualism	predicts	that,	
other	things	being	equal,	people	would	assess	their	previous	claim	as	
true	rather	than	false.10
Second,	people	presumably	are	good	counterfactual	 reasoners	at	
least	as	far	as	their	own	speech	behavior	 is	concerned.	That	 is,	 they	
generally	make	correct	judgments	about	what	they	would	say	in	this	
or	that	scenario.11	In	particular,	if	people	would	prefer	to	assess	their	
previous	claim	in	Σ1	and	Σ2	as	true	or	false,	we	would	expect	that	they	
also	judge	that	this	is	so.
10.	 The	 “other	 things	 equal”-qualification	 is	 important.	 People	 sometimes	 pre-
fer	linguistically	impermissible	assertions	over	permissible	ones.	We	just	as-
sume	that	this	requires	special	circumstances	(e.g.	confusion	or	insincerity).	
The	cases	we’ll	consider	below	don’t	feature	such	special	circumstances.	At	
least,	the	burden	of	proof	seems	to	be	on	our	opponents	here.
11.	 This	 should	be	our	default	 assumption	 if	we	want	 to	avoid	error-theoretic	
commitments.	See	additionally	Dunaway	et	al.	(2013)	for	evidence	that	phi-
losophers	are	good	at	predicting	the	speech	behavior	of	others.	We	see	no	ob-
vious	reason	why	philosophers	should	be	special	in	this	regard,	and,	on	the	
face	of	it,	it	should	only	be	easier	to	predict	one’s	own	speech	behavior.	More	
generally,	counterfactual	reasoning	is	such	an	integral	part	of	our	lives	that	
it	is	difficult	to	see	how	we	could	get	along	if	we	weren’t	good	at	it	(see	e.g.	
Byrne,	2016).
previous	assertions	(e.g.	MacFarlane,	2014:	ch.	5),	or	when	interpret-
ing	more	complex	linguistic	constructions	(e.g.	Kneer	et	al.,	2017).	Our	
focus	will	be	exclusively	on	the	indicated	truth-value	assessments.
3. Methodological Remarks
To	see	whether	the	contextualist	or	the	relativist	verdict	is	correct,	we	
have	to	derive	testable	predictions.	This	can	be	done	in	various	ways.	
In	the	present	section,	we	explain	how	we	chose	to	go	about	it.	To	be-
gin	with,	let	us	briefly	address	one	seemingly	straightforward	way	to	
test	the	verdicts	that	we	won’t	employ.
The	indicated	verdicts	involve	normative	assessments,	in	particular,	
claims	about	which	assertions	are	permissible.	To	the	extent	that	‘per-
missible’	 in	ordinary	English	(or	some	other	expression	such	as	 ‘cor-
rect’,	‘right’,	or	‘appropriate’)	tracks	the	notion	of	permissibility	in	play	
here,	 we	 could	 directly	 test	 whether	 people’s	 “permissibility”	 judg-
ments	are	 in	 line	with	 the	 indicated	verdicts.	This	 could	confirm	or	
disconfirm	these	verdicts	if	ordinary	speakers	generally	know	under	
which	conditions	an	assertion	is	permissible.
We	 aren’t	 entirely	 opposed	 to	 this	 approach.	 Knobe	 and	 Yalcin	
(2014:	 Experiment	 4),	 for	 instance,	 use	 this	method	when	 they	 ask	
people	to	make	“appropriateness”	judgments;	Marques	(2018:	3353n)	
and	Kneer	(ms)	similarly	ask	about	what	is	“required”	of	a	given	speak-
er;	and	Khoo	and	Knobe	(2018)	test	“correctness”	intuitions.	All	these	
studies	have	merits.
Still,	we	think	the	method	is	not	without	problems.	The	notion	of	
permissibility	 and	 similar	 normative	 notions	 scholars	 use	 to	 formu-
late	norms	of	speech	seems	to	be	at	least	semi-technical.	An	assertion	
can	be	permissible	or	impermissible	in	many	different	ways.	Assertion	
norms	are	presumably	intended	to	capture	only	one	specific	flavor	of	
permissibility,	 one	 that	 is	 dictated	 by	 linguistic	 rather	 than,	 say,	 so-
cial,	moral,	or	prudential	norms.	Consequently,	one	runs	the	risk	that	
people’s	judgments	latch	on	to	the	wrong	flavor.	If	they	do,	linguistic	
permissibility	won’t	play	a	role	in	what	they	judge	to	be	“permissible”.
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4.1 Experiment 1
Participants	 were	 presented	 with	 one	 of	 two	 vignettes.	 In	 each	 vi-
gnette,	 they	were	asked	 to	 imagine	 themselves	 in	a	situation	where	
they	change	their	taste	standard	over	time.	They	were	then	asked	to	
assess	how	likely	they	would	be	to	judge	a	previous	taste	claim	as	true	
or	false.	The	two	vignettes	differed	only	in	whether	participants	start	
out	liking	the	food	in	question	and	then	come	to	dislike	it	or	vice versa.
4.1.1 Method
289	 participants	 were	 recruited	 through	 Prolific	 Academic	 (56%	 fe-
male,	mean	age	38).	Each	participant	was	randomly	assigned	to	either	
of	two	conditions.	The	first	condition	(“NLtoL”	for	not	liking	to	liking)	
read	as	follows:
Picture yourself in the following scenario.
Yumble	 is	 a	 new	brand	 of	 bubblegum.	You	 have	 never	
had	a	Yumble.	One	day	you	decide	to	try	one.	You	don’t	
like	the	taste.	You	tell	your	friend	Paul:
“Yumble	isn’t	tasty.”
A	 few	weeks	 later,	 you	 and	Paul	meet	 at	 the	 check-out	
in	the	supermarket.	Yumble	hasn’t	changed	its	taste,	but	
you	have	now	come	to	like	it.	You	take	a	pack	from	the	
shelf.	Paul	says:
“That’s	 funny,	 I	 have	 a	 clear	 recollection	 of	 you	 saying	
‘Yumble	isn’t	tasty’	last	time	we	met!”
After	 reading	 this	 vignette,	 participants	 received	 instructions	 to	 rate	
how	likely	they	would	be	to	judge	what	they	said	before	as	true,	and	
how	likely	they	would	be	to	judge	it	as	false.	Answers	could	be	given	
by	moving	 sliders,	one	 for	each	 response,	on	a	 scale	 from	0	 to	 100.	
The	sliders	were	independent	from	one	another	(i.e.	responses	didn’t	
have	to	add	up	to	100).	Thus,	participants	could	set	both	sliders	to	0	
to	indicate	that	they	would	assess	their	previous	claim	as	neither	true	
This	gives	us	the	following	testable	predictions	for	Σ1	and	Σ2: 
Simple	relativist	predictions	for	Σ1	and	Σ2:
People	 will	 judge	 that:	 if	 they	 found	 themselves	 in	 κ2, 
they	would	prefer	to	assert	“What	I	said	was	false”	over	
asserting	“What	I	said	was	true”.
Simple	contextualist	predictions	for	Σ1	and	Σ2:
People	 will	 judge	 that:	 if	 they	 found	 themselves	 in	 κ2, 
they	would	prefer	 to	assert	 “What	 I	 said	was	 true”	over	
asserting	“What	I	said	was	false”.
We	chose	to	test	these	predictions	in	our	experiments.
Note	that	the	suggested	methodology	is	much	in	line	with	how	phi-
losophers	and	linguists	often	present	alleged	data	in	support	of	their	
theories.	In	many	cases,	they	don’t	start	out	with	intuitive	normative	
assessments,	but	rather	offer	intuitions	about	what	people	“would	say”	
in	a	given	case	(e.g.	MacFarlane,	2014:	13–14).	We’ll	employ	this	arm-
chair	method	in	a	formal	experimental	setting.
4. Experiments
With	these	preliminary	considerations	in	mind,	we	can	turn	to	our	ex-
periments.	We	report	three	experiments	in	this	section.	Experiment	1	
tests	whether	people	prefer	to	assess	previous	taste	claims	as	true	or	
false	after	a	change	in	taste.	The	findings	are	as	indicated	in	the	intro-
duction.	First,	people	are	split.	On	average	there	 is	no	preference	in	
either	direction.	Second,	the	preference	for	assessing	a	previous	taste	
claim	as	true	or	false	depends	on	the	direction	in	which	people	change	
their	taste	standard.	Experiment	2	and	3	corroborate	these	findings	by	
ruling	out	deflationary	accounts.	Experiment	2	underwrites	the	direc-
tion	effect	by	ruling	out	the	hypothesis	that	it	is	just	the	result	of	an	
aversion	towards	negations.	Experiment	3	underwrites	the	result	that	
people	are	split	by	ruling	out	the	hypothesis	that	participants	just	an-
swered	randomly	because	they	didn’t	understand	their	task.
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“Yumble	is	tasty.”
A	 few	weeks	 later,	 you	 and	Paul	meet	 at	 the	 check-out	
in	the	supermarket.	Yumble	hasn’t	changed	its	taste,	but	
you	don’t	like	it	anymore.	When	you	refuse	to	buy	Yum-
ble,	Paul	says:
“That’s	 funny,	 I	 have	 a	 clear	 recollection	 of	 you	 saying	
‘Yumble	is	tasty’	last	time	we	met!”
Again,	 participants	were	 asked	 to	 rate	 how	 likely	 they	would	 be	 to	
judge	what	they	said	before	as	true	and	how	likely	they	would	be	to	
judge	it	as	false,	by	moving	sliders	on	a	scale	between	0	and	100.	The	
assessments	in	this	condition	were	“What	I	said	was	false.	Yumble	isn’t	
tasty”	and	“What	I	said	was	true.	Still,	Yumble	isn’t	tasty”.
4.1.2 Results
Mean	responses	by	condition	are	displayed	in	Figure	1.
nor	false.	By	default,	the	sliders	were	set	to	0.	The	specific	instruction	
read	as	follows:
For	 each	of	 the	 following	 responses,	please	 tell	us	how	
likely	you	would	be	to	give	this	response	to	Paul’s	remark	
in	the	given	context.
The	specific	response	options	were	“What	I	said	was	false.	Yumble	is	
tasty”	and	 “What	 I	 said	was	 true.	Still,	Yumble	 is	 tasty.”	We	 inserted	
“still”	in	the	second	response	because	we	felt	that	there	was	a	contrast	
between	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	 sentence	 even	 on	 a	 contextualist	
view,	and	we	didn’t	want	to	downgrade	the	response	by	leaving	this	
contrast	unarticulated.12
The	 second	 condition	 (“LtoNL”	 for	 liking	 to	 not	 liking)	 differed	
from	 the	 first	 in	 that	 participants	 started	 out	 liking	 rather	 than	 dis-
liking	Yumble	and	ended	up	disliking	rather	than	liking	it.	It	read	as	
follows:
Picture yourself in the following scenario.
Yumble	 is	 a	 new	brand	 of	 bubblegum.	You	 have	 never	
had	a	Yumble.	One	day	you	decide	 to	 try	one.	You	 like	
the	taste.	You	tell	your	friend	Paul:
12.	 Contextualists	might	still	complain	that	we	are	artificially	downgrading	the	
“true”	response.	A	more	natural	way	of	putting	it,	 they	might	say,	would	be	
something	like	“What	I	said	was	true.	Still,	Yumble	is	tasty	to me now”.	Con-
textualists	would	presumably	explain	the	difference	in	naturalness	between	
this	response	and	the	one	we	offer	by	assuming	some	kind	of	communica-
tive	ideal	to	make	tacit	arguments	explicit	whenever	there	is	a	threat	of	mis-
understanding.	Note,	however,	that	our	primary	concern	is	whether	people	
prefer	 the	 “true”	 to	 the	 “false”	 response	 or vice versa.	 Even	 if	 our	 “true”	 re-
sponse	fails	to	live	up	to	the	indicated	ideal,	 it	should	still	be	preferable	to	
the	“false”	response	according	to	contextualism.	After	all,	even	as	stated,	the	
“false”	 response	 is	 false	according	 to	contextualism	and	the	“true”	 response	
true.	One	would	normally	not	prefer	to	say	something	outright	false	to	saying	
something	true	just	because	the	true	claim	is	not	ideal	in	terms	of	a	possible	
misunderstanding.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	it	would	be	uninteresting	
to	modify	the	“true”	response	in	the	suggested	way	and	to	see	how	this	affects	
results.	We’ll	leave	this	for	another	occasion.	Similar	considerations	apply	to	
the	“true”	response	in	the	next	condition.	
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=	35.46)	than	for	the	“true”	statement	(M	=	38.10,	SD	=	35.47),	t(144)	=	
3.01,	p	=	.003.	The	effect	size	was	small	to	medium	(d	=	.456).	In	the	
LtoNL	condition,	participants	gave	slightly	higher	ratings	for	the	“true”	
statement	 (M	 =	47.01,	SD	=	35.41)	 than	 for	 the	 “false”	 statement	 (M 
=	42.87,	SD	=	35.76),	but	this	difference	wasn’t	statistically	significant,	
t(144)	=	.78,	p	=	.435.
Even	though	average	responses	across	conditions	all	range	some-
where	around	the	mid-point	of	our	scale,	individual	participants	tend-
ed	to	have	more	categorical	preferences	in	that	they	gave	very	differ-
ent	ratings	for	the	different	statements.	As	a	rough	statistical	measure	
for	 this,	we	 found	 that	 the	 average	 absolute	 value	of	 the	difference	
between	the	response	to	the	“true”	and	the	“false”	statement	was	pretty	
high	in	the	LtoNL	condition	(M	=	54.67,	SD	=	32.30)	and	the	NLtoL	
condition	(M	=	58.17,	SD	=	30.28).
4.1.3 Discussion
We	can	report	two	main	findings.	First,	ordinary	speakers	seem	just	as	
split	as	philosophers	are	when	they	assess	previous	taste	claims	after	
a	change	in	taste	standards.	They	have	relatively	clear	preferences	for	
whether	to	assess	the	previous	claim	as	true	or	false,	but	these	prefer-
ences	are	more	or	 less	equally	 likely	 to	go	one	way	 rather	 than	 the	
other.	Call	this	result	the	even split.	Second,	which	preference	people	
have	is	affected	by	the	direction	in	which	they	change	their	taste	stan-
dard.	 In	particular,	 there	 is	 a	 stronger	preference	 for	 an	assessment	
as	false	when	people	start	out	disliking	rather	than	liking	the	food	in	
question.	Call	this	the	direction effect.
We	think	that	both	of	these	effects	are	interesting	and	surprising.	
Before	 we	 derive	 semantic/pragmatic	 conclusions	 from	 them,	 how-
ever,	we	want	to	rule	out	some	deflationary	accounts	of	the	data.	One	
might	try	to	explain	away	the	direction	effect	as	follows.	People	simply	
have	a	slight	aversion	toward	negated	claims	because	negated	claims	
are	 somewhat	 harder	 to	 process.	 This	 gives	 rise	 to	more	 “false”	 re-
sponses	in	NLtoL,	where	the	assessed	statement	is	“Yumble	isn’t	tasty”.	
Regarding	the	even	split,	one	could	propose	the	following	deflationary	
Figure 1. Mean	responses	by	condition	in	Experiment	1.	Error	bars	
show	95%	CI.
The	 data	 were	 analyzed	 using	 a	 mixed-model	 repeated	 measures	
ANOVA,	with	condition	(NLtoL	vs.	LtoNL)	as	a	between-subject	vari-
able	 and	 statement	 (“true”	 vs.	 “false”)	 as	 a	 within-subject	 variable.	
There	was	no	significant	main	effect	of	statement,	F(1,	287)	=	2.58,	p	=	
.11,	and	no	significant	main	effect	of	condition,	F(1,	287)	=	.45,	p	=	.50.	
But	there	was	a	significant	interaction,	F(1,	287)	=	7.36,	p	=	.007.	The	
effect	size	was	small	(ηp
2	=	.025).
To	further	explore	this	interaction,	we	compared	judgments	for	the	
two	 statements	within	 each	 condition.	 In	 the	NLtoL	 condition,	 par-
ticipants	gave	higher	ratings	for	the	“false”	statement	(M	=	54.28,	SD 
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Figure 2. Mean	responses	by	condition	in	Experiment	2.	Error	bars	
show	95%	CI.
As	before,	the	data	were	analyzed	using	a	mixed-model	repeated	mea-
sures	ANOVA,	with	condition	(NLtoL	vs.	LtoNL)	as	a	between-subject	
variable	and	statement	(“true”	vs.	“false”)	as	a	within-subject	variable.	
There	was	no	significant	main	effect	of	statement,	F(1,	249)	=	2.32,	p	=	
.13,	and	no	significant	main	effect	of	condition,	F(1,	249)	=	1.87,	p	=	.17.	
Again,	though,	there	was	a	significant	interaction,	F(1,	249)	=	5.02,	p	=	
.026.	As	before,	the	effect	size	was	small	(ηp
2	=	.020).
To	 further	 explore	 the	 interaction,	 we	 compared	 judgments	 for	
the	 two	 statements	 within	 each	 condition.	 In	 the	 NLtoL	 condition,	
account.	Our	experimental	paradigm	just	isn’t	working	properly.	Peo-
ple	don’t	understand	the	type	of	task	they	are	asked	to	perform	and	
answer	at	random.	The	following	experiments	aim	to	rule	out	these	
hypotheses.
4.2 Experiment 2
This	experiment	addresses	the	suggested	deflationary	account	of	the	
direction	effect	in	terms	of	an	aversion	towards	negated	claims.	To	test	
this	hypothesis,	we	eliminated	all	relevant	negations	by	replacing	“is	
tasty”	by	“tastes	good”	and	“isn’t	tasty”	by	“tastes	bad”	in	the	vignettes	
and	the	prompts.	This	should	eliminate	the	direction	effect	if	the	nega-
tion	hypothesis	is	sound.
4.2.1 Method
251	 participants	 were	 recruited	 through	 Amazon	 Mechanical	 Turk	
(49%	 female,	mean	 age	 36).	 As	 before,	 participants	 were	 randomly	
assigned	to	either	of	two	conditions.	The	conditions	were	exact	cop-
ies	of	the	above	NLtoL	and	LtoNL	conditions	except	that	we	replaced	
“Yumble	 is	 tasty”	with	 “Yumble	 tastes	good”	 and	 “Yumble	 isn’t	 tasty”	
with	“Yumble	tastes	bad”.
4.2.2 Results
Mean	responses	by	condition	are	displayed	in	Figure	2.
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4.3.1 Method
252	 participants	 were	 recruited	 through	 Prolific	 Academic	 (70%	 fe-
male,	mean	age	34).	The	study	design	was	as	described.
4.3.2 Results
Mean	responses	by	condition	are	shown	in	Figure	3.
Figure 3. Mean	responses	by	condition	in	Experiment	3.	Error	bars	
show	95%	CI.
Again,	 the	 data	 were	 analyzed	 using	 a	mixed-model	 repeated	mea-
sures	ANOVA,	with	condition	(NLtoL	vs.	LtoNL)	as	a	between-subject	
participants	gave	higher	ratings	for	 the	“false”	statement	(M	=	48.96,	
SD	=	36.19)	than	for	the	“true”	statement	(M	=	33.78,	SD	=	34.51),	t(129)	
=	2.81,	p	=	.006.	The	effect	was	small	to	medium	sized	(d	=	.429).	In	the	
LtoNL	condition,	participants	gave	slightly	higher	ratings	for	the	“true”	
statement	 (M	=	45.58,	SD	=	36.12)	 than	 for	 the	 “false”	 statement	 (M 
=	42.69,	SD	=	36.07),	but	as	before,	this	difference	wasn’t	statistically	
significant,	t(129)	=	.48,	p	=	.632.
Again,	 the	average	absolute	difference	between	 responses	 to	 the	
“true”	and	 the	 “false”	statement	was	high	 in	 the	LtoNL	condition	(M 
=	57.31,	SD	=	32.71)	and	the	NLtoL	condition	(M	=	54.17,	SD	=	32.72).
4.2.3 Discussion
The	experiment	replicated	our	results	from	Experiment	1.	Across	con-
ditions,	there	was	no	preference	for	the	“true”	or	the	“false”	response.	
The	“false”	response	was	preferred	in	cases	where	participants	started	
out	 disliking	Yumble,	 but	 there	was	 no	 clear	 preference	 either	way	
in	 the	 other	 condition.	 These	 results	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 negation	
hypothesis:	We	 find	 a	 direction	 effect	 even	when	 no	 negations	 are	
involved.
4.3 Experiment 3
This	experiment	was	designed	to	test	the	deflationary	account	of	the	
even	split,	according	to	which	people	simply	don’t	understand	the	task	
they	are	asked	to	perform	and	consequently	respond	at	 random.	To	
test	this	hypothesis,	we	reran	experiment	1	with	“Yumble	is/isn’t	tasty”	
replaced	by	“I	find/don’t	find	Yumble	tasty”.	Since	contextualist	treat-
ments	of	the	latter	sentences	are	more	or	less	uncontroversial,	we	get	
the	more	or	less	uncontroversial	theoretical	prediction	that	the	“true”	
response	 should	be	 favored.	Meanwhile,	 if	 participants	don’t	under-
stand	our	task,	we	should	still	see	random,	middling	responses.	Inci-
dentally,	this	setup	gave	us	another	way	to	test	the	previous	negation	
hypothesis.	This	hypothesis	still	predicts	a	direction	effect	because	we	
still	have	a	negation	in	only	one	of	the	vignettes.
	 alexander	dinges	&	julia	zakkou A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates
philosophers’	imprint	 –		13		– vol.	20,	no.	27	(september	2020)
Part II: Explaining the data
In	this	part	of	the	paper,	we	present	an	account	of	the	two	effects	we	
found:	the	even	split	and	the	direction	effect.	After	presenting	the	ac-
count	we	favor,	we	raise	some	challenges	to	alternative	accounts.
6. The Even Split
To	explain	the	even	split,	we	want	to	suggest	what	we	call	simple hybrid 
relativism.	The	basic	idea	behind	this	view	is	that	there	is	an	ambigu-
ity	in	taste	claims	that	is	unresolved	in	our	vignettes.	People	are	torn	
between	two	competing	readings,	which	leads	to	average	responses	
in	a	middling	range.	We	begin	by	presenting	simple	hybrid	relativism	
in	more	detail	and	further	clarify	how	it	explains	the	even	split	below.
Simple	hybrid	relativism	crucially	departs	 from	simple	relativism	
when	it	comes	to	R1,	the	claim	that	‘F	is/isn’t	tasty’	invariably	asserts	
that	F	is/isn’t	tasty.	According	to	simple	hybrid	relativism,	sentences	
of	this	form	are	ambiguous	(or	polysemous)	between	a	relativist	and	
a	 contextualist	 reading.	They	 can	be	used	 to	 assert	 either	 that	 F	 is/
isn’t	 tasty	 (relativist	 reading)	 or	 that	 F	 is/isn’t	 tasty	 by	 the	 lights	 of	
the	taste	standard	determined	by	the	context	of	utterance	(contextu-
alist	 reading).14	 The	 assumptions	R2,	R3,	 and	R-SIMP	 remain	 as	 be-
fore.	Simple	hybrid	relativists	need	a	further	assumption	that	specifies	
“true”	and	no	direction	effect.	But	the	direction	effect	remained	unaffected	(F(1,	
251)	=	7.33,	p	=	.007,	ηp
2	=	.028).	And	while	we	did	see	a	small	preference	for	
“true”	(F(1,	251)	=	7.30,	p	=	.007,	ηp
2	=	.028)	across	conditions,	this	effect	was	
entirely	driven	by	the	LtoNL	condition	(M	=	53.17,	SD	=	35.39	vs.	M	=	32.17,	
SD	=	32.74,	 t(126)	=	3.99,	p	<.001),	with	no	 significant	difference	between	
“true”	and	“false”	in	the	NLtoL	condition	(M	=	42.60,	SD	=	35.26	vs.	M	=	42.61,	
SD	=	35.47,	t(125)	=	-.003,	p	=	.998).	This	still	seems	puzzling	(also	contrast	
the	results	from	Experiment	3).	
14.	 The	 suggested	 ambiguity	 in	 ‘F	 is/isn’t	 tasty’	 could	 arise	 in	 two	ways.	 The	
expression	 ‘tasty’	could	either	be	ambiguous	or	it	could	feature	a	slot	for	a	
pronoun	that	can	be	filled	in	in	a	relativist	or	a	contextualist	way	(see	e.g	Ste-
phenson,	2007:	503	for	the	latter	proposal).	For	our	present	purposes,	either	
account	 works	 fine.	 Notice	 that	 Stephenson	 allows	 for	 contextualist	 read-
ings	of	‘tasty’,	and	so	her	view	may	count	as	a	version	of	hybrid	relativism	in	
our	sense.	Her	primary	reason	for	positing	a	contextualist	reading,	however,	
seems	to	reside	 in	considerations	about	exocentric	contexts	(for	which	e.g.	
MacFarlane,	2014:	155–156	offers	an	alternative,	relativist	account).	We	think	
variable	and	statement	(“true”	vs.	“false”)	as	a	within-subject	variable.	
There	was	a	significant	main	effect	of	statement,	F(1,	244)	=	71.20,	p	<	
.001,	with	participants	preferring	 the	 “true”	 response	over	 the	 “false”	
response.	The	effect	size	was	large	(ηp
2	=	.226).	There	was	no	main	ef-
fect	of	condition,	F(1,	244)	<	.001,	p	=	.99,	and	there	was	no	interaction	
either,	F(1,	244)	=	.523,	p	=	.47.
4.3.3 Discussion
People	 had	 a	 clear	 preference	 for	 the	 “true”	 response	 across	 condi-
tions,	thereby	tracking	an	uncontroversial	theoretical	prediction.	This	
suggests	that	they	understood	our	prompts	and	hence	that	we	need	a	
more	specific	explanation	of	the	even	split.	In	addition,	the	results	put	
further	pressure	on	the	negation	hypothesis.	On	this	hypothesis,	we	
would	have	expected	a	direction	effect,	which	we	didn’t	find.
5. Intermediate Conclusion
This	concludes	the	first	part	of	our	paper.	We	have	explained	how	to	
derive	competing	predictions	from	contextualism	and	relativism	and	
how	to	test	them	in	an	experimental	setting.	We	have	tested	them	and	
found	two	 interesting	effects:	 the	even	split	and	the	direction	effect.	
For	each	of	these	effects,	we	have	ruled	out	deflationary	accounts,	ac-
cording	to	which	the	results	have	no	semantic/pragmatic	significance.	
From	now	on,	we	will	 assume	 that	 the	 effects	 should	 be	 accommo-
dated	at	the	level	of	semantics/pragmatics.	The	subsequent	part	of	the	
paper	looks	at	how	this	could	be	done.13
13.	 A	reviewer	points	out	that	one’s	reactions	upon	trying	Yumble	once	might	not	
suffice	to	settle	whether	it	tastes	good	to	one,	e.g.	because	the	circumstances	
might	have	been	weird.	This	could	explain	the	even	split	even	on	a	simple	
contextualist	account.	It	might	also	help	to	explain	the	direction	effect	if	it	is	
easier	to	 imagine	circumstances	where	something	appears	not	tasty	to	you	
while	in	fact	being	tasty	to	you	than	the	other	way	around	(we	grant	this	latter	
assumption	though	it	seems	controversial).	To	put	pressure	on	this	proposal,	
we	reran	experiment	1	(N	=	259),	this	time	stating	that	the	protagonist	had	
tried	Yumble	“many	times	before	under	various	normal	circumstances”.	De-
pending	on	the	condition,	she	either	“always	liked	the	taste”	or	“never	liked	
the	taste”.	This	should	settle	the	relevant	facts	pretty	firmly.	Thus,	on	the	indi-
cated	simple	contextualist	account,	we	should	now	see	a	clear	preference	for	
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better	accounted	 for	 if	we	replace	H-SIMP	by	some	principle	 to	 the	
effect	that	e.g.	the	taste	standard	of	a	context	is	the	taste	standard	of	
some	salient	subject	in	the	context.	These	issues	are	orthogonal	to	our	
present	project,	so	we’ll	leave	them	aside.15
To	see	that	 the	ambiguity	suggested	in	H1	 is	not	ad hoc,	consider	
the	following	dialogues	quoted	from	Schaffer	(2011:	213–215;	see	also	
Stojanovic,	2007:	693–694	and	Bylinina,	2017:	298):
[δ1]
Ben:	Hey	Ann,	 I’d	 like	 to	buy	you	a	gift.	What’s	your	 fa-
vorite	treat?
Ann:	Licorice	is	tasty
Ben: No,	licorice	is	not	tasty
Ann:	Listen,	I	was	just	saying	that	I	like	it	
[δ2]
Ann: Licorice	is	tasty
Ben: No,	licorice	is	not	tasty
Ann: Yes	it	is
Like	Schaffer,	we	think	that	both	of	Ann’s	responses	in	the	above	dia-
logues	are	fine.	The	suggested	ambiguity	explains	this.	In	δ1,	“Licorice	
is	tasty”	is	read	in	terms	of	simple	contextualism.	Thus,	Ann	is	(rough-
ly)	 saying	 that	 licorice	 is	 tasty	 to her in	 her	first	 utterance.	 It	makes	
perfect	sense	then	for	her	to	point	this	out	later	on.	In	δ2,	“Licorice	is	
tasty”	is	read	in	terms	of	relativism.	Thus,	Ann	and	Ben	are	expressing	
contradicting	propositions	(that	 licorice	 is	 tasty	vs.	 that	 licorice	 isn’t	
tasty),	and	it	makes	sense	for	Ann	to	insist	on	that.16
15.	 See	e.g.	Lasersohn	(2005);	Stephenson	(2007);	and	MacFarlane	(2014:	155–
156)	 for	 further	discussion	of	 the	 relevant	phenomena	 in	 relativist-friendly	
terms.
16.	 See	Kölbel	 (2014:	 105)	 for	 details	 on	 how	 to	 define	 contradictoriness	 in	 a	
the	truth-condition	for	 the	proposition	asserted	on	the	contextualist	
reading.	To	do	so,	they	use	C2	from	above,	adapting	it	to	a	semantic	
framework	where	circumstances	of	evaluation	contain	a	taste	standard	
in	addition	to	a	point	in	time.	In	sum,	hybrid	relativism	comprises	the	
following	claims.
H1.	The	proposition	asserted	by	‘F	is/isn’t	tasty’	in	a	giv-
en	context	κ	is	either	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	
(relativist	reading)	or	the	proposition	that	F	is/isn’t	tasty	
by	the	lights	of	the	taste	standard	determined	by	κ	(con-
textualist	reading).
H2a	 (=	R2).	 The	proposition	 that	 F	 is/isn’t	 tasty	 is	 true	
relative	to	<t,s>	iff,	at	t,	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	the	lights	of	s.
H2b	 (≈	C2).	The	proposition	 that	 F	 is/isn’t	 tasty	by	 the	
lights	of	s’	is	true	relative	to	<t,s>	iff,	at	t,	F	is/isn’t	tasty	by	
the	lights	of	s’.
H3	(=	R3).	One	is	permitted	to	assert	that	p	in	a	context	
κ	 iff	the	proposition	that	p	is	true	relative	to	the	circum-
stance	of	evaluation	determined	by	κ.
H-SIMP	(=	R-SIMP).	The	taste	standard	determined	by	a	
given	context	is	simply	the	taste	standard	that	the	speaker	
of	that	context	has	at	the	time	of	the	context.
Note	 that	 even	 though	we’ll	 stick	with	 simple	 hybrid	 relativism	 for	
the	 purposes	 of	 this	 paper,	we	 are	 not	 committed	 to	 simplicity.	We	
think	that	H-SIMP	makes	correct	predictions	 for	 the	contexts	 in	 the	
specific	conditions	we	consider	(NLtoL	and	LtoNL).	But	there	might	
be	 other	 contexts	 that	 force	 us	 to	make	 the	 view	more	 flexible.	 So-
called	“exocentric”	contexts	(Lasersohn,	2005),	for	instance,	might	be	
contextualist	 readings	play	 an	 important	 role	 even	 in	 autocentric	 contexts,	
and	in	particular,	in	the	kinds	of	contexts	described	in	our	vignettes.
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roughly,	that	negative	interpretations	tend	to	be	favored.	The	second	
ingredient	is	a	Stalnakerian	framework	of	assertion.	We	use	this	frame-
work	to	derive	an	asymmetry	in	how	negative	the	contextualist	and	
the	relativist	readings	respectively	are.
7.1 First ingredient: when in doubt, assume the worst 
The	first	ingredient	in	our	account	of	the	direction	effect	concerns	how	
hearers	select	a	specific	reading	in	cases	of	ambiguity	or	more	gener-
ally,	cases	where	different	candidate	interpretations	of	a	given	speech	
act	are	available.	In	particular,	we	will	assume	that	a	principle	along	
the	following	lines	plays	some	default	interpretive	role.
NEG.	 If	 it’s	 possible	 to	 interpret	 a	 speaker	 as	making	 a	
more	or	a	less	negative	assessment,	then,	other	things	be-
ing	equal,	the	more	negative	one	is	what	the	speaker	has	
in	mind.17
To	 see	 the	 plausibility	 of	 NEG,	 suppose	 you	 are	 confronted	with	 a	
claim	 that	 can	be	 read	 in	a	more	negative	and	a	more	positive	way	
and	that	the	context	doesn’t	clearly	disambiguate	between	these	read-
ings.	Here	is	a	natural	train	of	thought.	If	the	speaker	wanted	to	convey	
the	positive	message,	she	presumably	wouldn’t	have	taken	the	risk	of	
being	 interpreted	 in	 the	more	negative	way.	After	 all,	 negative	mes-
sages	can	have	bad	consequences.	A	negative	assessment	can	make	
the	addressee	mad	at	you,	hurt	their	feelings,	or	lead	them	to	see	you	
as	a	negative	person.	The	speaker	apparently	took	that	risk,	so	she	pre-
sumably	didn’t	want	to	convey	the	positive	message	but	the	negative	
one	instead.	Why	didn’t	she	say	it	straight?	Maybe	she	was	just	being	
polite,	leaving	open	a	more	positive,	face-saving	interpretation.
Suppose,	for	instance,	that	I	say,	“It	wasn’t	the	best	talk	I	ever	heard”.	
I	could	mean	that	the	talk	in	question	wasn’t	the	best	but	that	it	was	
17.	 To	a	first	approximation,	an	assessment	can	be	understood	here	as	a	speech	
act	that	conveys	(semantically	or	pragmatically	or	in	some	other	way)	that	a	
target	object	has	certain	 features.	 It	 is	more	or	 less	negative	depending	on	
how	(un-)desirable	these	features	are	in	an	object	of	the	relevant	type.	See	
relatedly	Ruytenbeek	et	al.	(2017:	4–6)	on	“evaluative	polarity”.
Simple	hybrid	relativism	can	be	used	to	explain	the	even	split	as	
follows.	Take	NLtoL	(the	story	for	LtoNL	is	analogous).	According	to	
simple	hybrid	 relativism,	 the	utterance	of	 ‘Yumble	 isn’t	 tasty’	 in	 the	
initial	context	can	receive	either	a	simple	relativist	or	a	simple	contex-
tualist	 reading.	 Suppose	 a	participant	 chooses	 the	 relativist	 reading.	
Then	we	can	use	 the	derivation	 in	§2	and	§3	 to	arrive	at	 the	predic-
tion	that	they	will	prefer	to	judge	the	initial	utterance	as	false	later	on.	
Suppose	they	adopt	the	contextualist	reading.	Again,	we	can	use	the	
derivation	in	§2	and	§3	to	arrive	at	the	prediction	that	they	will	later	
assess	the	initial	utterance	as	true.	Now,	in	the	context	of	the	initial	ut-
terance,	nothing	clearly	disambiguates	between	the	contextualist	and	
the	 relativist	 reading	 (unlike	 in	δ1	 and	δ2,	where	a	clear	disambigua-
tion	is	made	in	the	course	of	the	ongoing	discussion).	We	would	thus	
expect	that	some	people	choose	one	reading,	some	people	the	other,	
and	that	some	people	are	torn	between	these	readings.	This	gives	rise	
to	the	even	split.
What	remains	 to	be	seen	 is	how	simple	hybrid	relativism	can	be	
used	to	explain	the	direction	effect,	 that	 is,	 the	result	 that	 there	 is	a	
slightly	 stronger	preference	 for	 “false”	 in	NLtoL	 than	 in	LtoNL.	The	
basic	 idea	will	be	 that	 there	 is	a	slightly	stronger	preference	 for	 the	
relativist	reading	in	this	condition.	The	following	sections	outline	how	
this	strengthened	preference	for	the	relativist	reading	comes	about.
7. The Direction Effect
Our	 account	 of	 the	 direction	 effect	 has	 two	 ingredients	 in	 addition	
to	simple	hybrid	 relativism.	The	first	 ingredient	 is	a	principle	about	
how	people	tend	to	resolve	ambiguities.	The	suggested	principle	says,	
relativist	framework.	Once	we	accept	this	definition,	hybrid	relativism	makes	
exactly	 the	same	predictions	about	 familiar	disagreement	data	as	standard	
forms	of	relativism.	The	only	difference	is	that	these	predictions	are	restricted	
to	contexts	like	δ2,	where	the	respective	sentences	receive	a	relativist	reading.	
Dialogues	like	δ1	show	that	this	restriction	is	desirable.	Analogous	things	can	
be	said	about	retraction	data.	Of	course,	there	is	by	now	a	wide-ranging	de-
bate	on	whether	relativism	makes	the	right	predictions	about	disagreement	
and	 retraction	data.	We	cannot	enter	 this	debate	here,	but	 see	e.g.	Dinges	
(2017)	and	Beddor	and	Egan	(2018)	for	recent	relativist-friendly	discussion.
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is	typically	taken	to	comprise	the	mutually	accepted	propositions.	We	
will	assume	that	people	have	no	reason	to	accept	anything	other	than	
what	they	believe	in	our	cases	NLtoL	and	LtoNL.	Thus,	for	our	purpos-
es,	the	common	ground	will	comprise	the	mutually	believed	proposi-
tions.	An	assertion	will	thus	be	understood	as	a	proposal	to	come	to	
mutually	believe	what’s	been	asserted.20
This	view	has	 the	 important	consequence	 that	we	can	accommo-
date	a	 relativistic	assertion	only	 if	our	 taste	standards	agree	with	re-
spect	 to	 the	 food	 in	question.	Suppose,	 for	 instance,	 that	you	assert	
that	fish	sticks	are	tasty.	On	the	given	view,	this	assertion	is	a	proposal	
to	update	 the	 common	ground	with	 the	proposition	 that	fish	 sticks	
are	tasty.	To	accommodate	the	assertion,	we	have	to	mutually	believe	
this	proposition.	We	can	properly	do	this,	though,	only	if	the	asserted	
proposition	is	true	relative	to	the	taste	standard	of	all	the	participants	
in	 the	 conversation.	 For	 otherwise,	 people	 end	 up	 believing	 things	
that	 aren’t	 true	 from	 their	perspective	 (we	are	 assuming	a	 reflexive	
belief	norm	analogous	to	the	assertion	norm	H3	above;	see	e.g.	Kölbel,	
2003:	70).
7.3 Accounting for the direction effect
With	 these	 ingredients	 at	 hand,	we	 can	 explain	 the	 direction	 effect.	
Consider	NLtoL.	Given	simple	hybrid	relativism,	‘Yumble	isn’t	tasty’	as	
uttered	in	the	initial	conversation	can	be	read	in	a	relativist	and	a	con-
textualist	way.	On	either	interpretation,	the	resulting	assertion	reflects	
negatively	 on	 Yumble.	 Given	 the	 Stalnakerian	 account	 of	 assertion,	
though,	 the	relativist	reading	 is	more	negative.	On	the	contextualist	
norms	govern	assertions,	we	aren’t	committed	to	the	idea	that	these	norms	
are	constitutive	of	assertion	(see	Williamson,	1996).
20.	See	e.g.	Egan	(2007:	15–21;	2014:	91–92);	and	Kölbel	(2013)	for	more	techni-
cal	accounts	of	the	common	ground	and	how	to	adjust	them	to	make	room	for	
relativistic	assertions.	See	e.g.	Kölbel	(2013)	for	the	idea	that	we	sometimes	
propose	to	update	the	common	ground	not	with	the	asserted	proposition	but	
with	some	suitable	surrogate.	We	are	happy	to	grant	this	general	point.	It	suf-
fices	for	us	if	plain	“tasty”	sentences	add	what	they	assert	(as	Kölbel,	2013:	118	
grants).
still	quite	good.	I’m	more	likely	to	be	understood	though	as	conveying	
the	more	negative	message	that	the	talk	was	bad.	It’s	natural	to	think	
that	the	kind	of	reasoning	just	described	plays	some	role	at	least	in	the	
selection	of	this	reading.	The	speaker	presumably	wouldn’t	have	taken	
the	risk	of	being	understood	in	such	a	negative	way	unless	she	really	
wanted	to	communicate	the	negative	message.	And	she’s	presumably	
just	being	polite	in	leaving	open	a	more	positive,	face-saving	interpre-
tation.	Note	the	contrast	here	to	“It	wasn’t	the	worst	talk	I	ever	heard”,	
which	is	much	less	likely	to	receive	a	strengthened,	positive	reading	to	
the	effect	that	the	talk	was	good.18
To	be	sure,	the	reasoning	described	in	support	of	NEG	is	highly	de-
feasible	and	maybe	some	people	don’t	engage	in	such	types	of	reason-
ing	at	all.	NEG	should	be	construed	as	similarly	weak.	Note,	though,	
that	we	will	use	NEG	as	an	ingredient	in	an	account	of	the	direction	
effect.	This	effect	is	robust	but	small,	so	a	slight	tendency	is	just	what	
we	need.
7.2 Second ingredient: a Stalnakerian account of assertion
Here	is	the	second	ingredient	in	our	account	of	the	direction	effect.	We	
want	to	embed	hybrid	relativism	in	a	Stalnakerian	account	of	assertion,	
according	which	an	assertion	is	a	proposal	to	add	the	asserted	propo-
sition	to	the	common	ground (Stalnaker,	1978).19	The	common	ground	
18.	 Horn	(1989:	333–334)	observes	a	similar	asymmetry	in	a	broad	range	of	cases	
featuring	 negated	 positive	 vs.	 negated	 negative	 adjectives.	 Ruytenbeek	 et	
al.	 (2017)	 confirm	 this	 asymmetry	 experimentally.	Horn	 also	 suggests	 that	
the	asymmetry	results	from	politeness	considerations	of	the	kind	above.	He	
notes,	for	instance,	that	“[i]f	I	tell	you	that	I	don’t	approve	of	your	behavior,	
you	may	infer	that	(presumably	to	spare	your	feelings)	I	am	concealing	my	
active	disapproval”	 (334).	See	Leech	(1983:	135–136)	and	Brown	and	Levin-
son	(1987)	for	more	on	the	politeness	norms	that	might	be	in	play	here.	See	
Krifka	(2007)	for	a	competing	account	of	the	asymmetry	(and	Ruytenbeek	et	
al.,	2017:	6–8	for	a	helpful	reconstruction	of	Krifka’s	account).	We	can’t	settle	
the	dispute	between	Horn	and	Krifka	here,	but	we	hope	that	the	above	gen-
eral	considerations	in	favor	of	NEG	are	plausible	enough	independently	of	
whether	they	fully	explain	the	indicated	asymmetry.
19.	 The	 Stalnakerian	 account	 of	 assertion	 is	 consistent	 with	 our	 previous	 as-
sumption	of	norms	of	assertion.	In	fact,	it	might	even	support	these	norms	
(see	e.g.	MacFarlane,	2011:	89).	Notice	that	while	we’re	assuming	that	certain	
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whether	more	familiar	forms	of	relativism	and	contextualism	already	
make	sense	of	our	findings.	
8. Conservative Accounts
8.1 Contextualism
Let’s	begin	with	contextualism.	It	should	be	clear	that	simple	contex-
tualists	have	a	hard	time	making	sense	of	our	data.	As	we	saw	in	§2	
and	§3,	people	should	show	a	preference	for	assessing	the	initial	utter-
ances	in	NLtoL	and	LtoNL	as	true	across	conditions	if	simple	contex-
tualism	holds.	In	fact,	however,	we	found	the	even	split.
There	are	three	ways	for	contextualists	to	revise	their	view	in	light	
of	this	outcome.	The	first	is	to	adopt	a	flexible	version	of	contextual-
ism,	according	 to	which	 the	 taste	standard	determined	by	a	context	
isn’t	univocally	tied	to	the	current	taste	standard	of	the	speaker	of	the	
context	(e.g.	Stojanovic,	2007;	Schaffer,	2011;	Dowell,	2011).	Schaffer	
(2011:	 191–192),	 for	 instance,	 suggests	 that	 stereotypical	 contexts	 ei-
ther	determine	this	individual	taste	standard	or	else	the	taste	standard	
of	“the	typical	person”.	Thus,	a	sentence	like	‘Yumble	is	tasty’	has	an	
individualistic	 reading,	 where	 it	 roughly	 expresses	 that	 the	 speaker	
likes	Yumble,	and	a	generic	 reading,	where	 it	 roughly	expresses	 that	
people	generally	like	Yumble.	One	might	think	that	the	even	split	re-
sults	because	the	context	doesn’t	clearly	determine	either	one	of	these	
interpretations.
But	 it	does.	The	speaker’s	own	personal	experience	with	Yumble	
provides	at	best	a	weak	justification	for	the	propositions	that	people	
in	general	like	or	dislike	Yumble.	This	justification	seems	too	weak	to	
assert	these	generic	propositions.	To	see	this,	just	consider	how	overly	
strong	such	assertions	would	sound	in	the	contexts	we	describe	(see	
Lasersohn,	2005:	652	and	MacFarlane,	 2014:	 12	 for	 related	 consider-
ations).	By	a	principle	of	charity,	participants	should	favor	the	perfectly	
justified	individualistic	 interpretation.	This,	 in	turn,	should	lead	to	a	
preference	 for	 the	 “true”	 response,	not	 the	even	split.	Maybe	a	case	
reading,	the	speaker	is	merely	reporting	her	own	disliking.	On	the	rel-
ativist	reading,	she	proposes	to	update	the	common	ground	in	a	way	
that	is	acceptable	only	if	everybody	in	the	conversation	(i.e.	Paul	and	
the	speaker)	dislikes	Yumble.	Consequently,	NEG	creates	pressure	to	
choose	the	relativist	reading.21
Consider	now	the	LtoNL	condition.	Given	simple	hybrid	relativism,	
‘Yumble	is	tasty’	as	uttered	initially	can	again	be	read	in	a	relativist	or	a	
contextualist	way.	On	either	interpretation,	the	assessment	of	Yumble	
is	positive.	Given	the	Stalnakerian	account,	the	assessment	of	Yumble	
is	less	positive	on	the	contextualist	reading.	Again,	this	is	so	because,	
on	the	contextualist	reading,	the	speaker	merely	pronounces	on	her	
own	positive	opinion;	whereas	on	the	relativist	reading,	she	makes	a	
proposal	to	update	the	common	ground	that	can	be	accepted	only	if	
everybody	(the	speaker	and	Paul)	likes	Yumble.	By	NEG,	there	is	pres-
sure	to	choose	the	contextualist	reading.
NEG	works	in	different	directions	in	NLtoL	and	LtoNL.	In	particu-
lar,	it	pressures	us	towards	the	relativist	reading	in	the	former	condi-
tion	and	towards	the	contextualist	reading	in	the	latter.	We	would	thus	
expect	a	 stronger	preference	 for	 the	 relativist	over	 the	contextualist	
reading	in	NLtoL.	Via	the	derivations	described	in	§2	and	§3,	this	gives	
rise	to	a	stronger	preference	for	the	“false”	over	the	“true”	response	i.e.	
the	direction	effect.
This	concludes	the	presentation	of	our	account	of	the	data.	We	think	
that	 the	 account	 is	 independently	motivated	 and	plausible.	We	 still	
grant	that	further	work	will	need	to	be	done.	The	motivation	for	NEG, 
for	instance,	remains	at	an	intuitive	level	and	the	ambiguity	posited	by	
hybrid	 relativism	may	give	rise	 to	 independent	predictions	 that	will	
have	 to	be	 explored.	 Instead	of	 addressing	 these	questions,	 though,	
we	want	to	discuss	some	alternative	accounts	of	our	data.	The	task	will	
be	to	assess	whether	the	switch	to	hybrid	relativism	is	motivated	or	
21.	 Note	here	that	our	participants	have	to	decide	which	reading	they	most	plau-
sibly	intended	to	convey	in	the	story	described.	It’s	natural	to	think	that	they	
use	the	same	types	of	methods	to	figure	this	out	as	they	would	otherwise	use	
to	interpret	other	speakers.
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A	 third	 and	 more	 radical	 strategy	 would	 be	 to	 go	 pluralist	 or	
“cloudy”	(e.g.	Cappelen	and	Lepore,	2005;	von	Fintel	and	Gillies,	2011).	
A	contextualist	might	hold	that	the	respective	initial	assertion	in	our	
vignettes	puts	 into	play	a	cloud	of	propositions	about	various	differ-
ent	groups	of	tasters,	including	groups	containing	just	the	speaker,	the	
speaker	and	their	audience,	and	maybe	consumers	of	Yumble	in	gen-
eral.	This	cloudiness,	in	turn,	might	be	taken	to	result	in	the	even	split.
But	as	far	as	we	can	see,	cloudy	contextualism	properly	understood	
doesn’t	predict	the	even	split,	but	rather	a	preference	for	the	“true”	re-
sponse.	The	later	assessments	of	“what	is	said”	as	true	or	false	presum-
ably	inherit	the	cloudiness	of	the	respective	initial	utterance,	thereby	
putting	into	play	the	very	same	groups	of	tasters	as	before.	Following	
von	 Fintel	 and	Gillies	 (2011:	 120),	 proper	 cloudy	 assertion	 requires	
that	the	speaker	is	“in	a	position	to	flat	out	assert	one	of	the	[proposi-
tions	in	the	cloud]”.	Now,	take	an	assertion	of	‘What	I	said	was	true’	in	
e.g.	NLtoL.	As	indicated,	one	proposition	in	the	cloud	here	should	be	
that	it’s	true	that	the	speaker	disliked	Yumble.	This	proposition	is	cer-
tainly	assertable,	and	so	the	assertion	should	be	fine	by	the	indicated	
norm	of	assertion.	Contrast	 ‘What	 I	 said	was	 false’.	Here,	 it	 is	much	
less	clear	that	the	respective	cloud	contains	an	assertable	proposition.	
The	speaker	isn’t	in	a	position	to	assert	that	it’s	false	that	she	disliked	
Yumble.	To	the	contrary,	she	disliked	Yumble	and	she	knows	that.	She	
isn’t	in	a	position	either	to	assert	that	it’s	false	that	she	and	Paul	dis-
liked	Yumble.	For	all	she	knows,	Paul	disliked	Yumble,	too.	Finally,	she	
isn’t	in	a	position	to	assert	that	it’s	false	that	people	in	general	disliked	
Yumble.	Again,	maybe	people	generally	did	dislike	Yumble,	just	as	the	
speaker	herself	did	 initially.	 In	summary,	we	should	expect	a	prefer-
ence	for	the	“true”	response,	not	the	even	split.
8.2 Relativism
Consider	 relativism.	 Again,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 simple	 relativism	 falters	
when	it	comes	to	the	even	split.	On	this	view,	there	should	have	been	
a	preference	for	the	“false”	response	across	conditions	(§2	and	§3).
could	be	made	that	the	generic	 interpretation	remains	in	play	some-
how,	but	the	burden	of	proof	seems	to	be	on	our	opponents.
Note	here	that	similar	worries	don’t	arise	in	the	case	of	simple	hy-
brid	relativism,	where	both	assumed	readings	yield	justified	assertions.	
The	initial	assertions	in	LtoNL	and	NLtoL	are	justified	on	the	simple	
contextualist	 reading,	 for	 the	 speaker	 knows	 that	 she	 likes/dislikes	
Yumble	at	 the	 initial	point	 in	 time.	They	are	 justified	on	 the	 simple	
relativist	reading	too	because	the	speaker	knows	that	the	correctness	
conditions	described	in	H3	are	satisfied.	Again,	this	just	requires	that	
they	know	they	like/dislike	Yumble	at	the	initial	point	in	time.
A	second	strategy	on	behalf	of	contextualism	is	to	stick	with	sim-
ple	 contextualism	 and	 add	 a	 pragmatic	 overlay	 instead.	Contextual-
ists	 could	 say,	 for	 instance,	 that	 ‘tasty’	 triggers	 a	 “presupposition	 of	
commonality”,	i.e.	a	presupposition	to	the	effect	that	a	relevant	group	
of	people	shares	the	speaker’s	taste	preferences	(López	de	Sa,	2008;	
2015).	Alternatively,	they	could	appeal	to	“metalinguistic	negotiation”	
(Sundell,	 2011;	 Plunkett	 and	 Sundell,	 2013)	 and	 suggest	 that	 “tasty”	
claims	somehow	convey	that	 ‘tasty’	ought	 to	be	used	 in	a	particular	
way	(see	Zakkou,	2019	for	a	related	account).	This	might	help	to	make	
sense	of	the	even	split	as	follows.	Some	people	assess	the	proposition	
expressed,	which	is	true;	some	people	assess	the	proposition	pragmat-
ically	conveyed,	which	is	false.	On	average,	we	end	up	in	the	middle.
Such	pragmatic	accounts	face	challenges,	too.	First,	it	needs	to	be	
argued	that	merely	pragmatically	conveyed	contents	have	that	strong	
an	effect	on	whether	we	assess	“what	is	said”	as	true	or	false.	Larson	
et	 al.	 (2009a)	 and	 Larson	 et	 al.	 (2009b),	 for	 instance,	 provide	 evi-
dence	that	many	pragmatically	conveyed	contents	only	mildly	affect	
truth-value	assessments	of	the	relevant	kind.	Second,	even	if	we	grant	
the	suggested	account	of	 the	even	split,	 it	 is	unclear	how	pragmatic	
contextualism	could	be	developed	further	to	make	sense	of	the	direc-
tion	 effect.	 The	 basic	 idea	would	 presumably	 have	 to	 be	 that	 there	
are	asymmetries	in	how	much	people	focus	on	the	pragmatic	rather	
than	the	semantic	content	in	NLtoL	vs.	LtoNL.	We	don’t	see	how	these	
asymmetries	should	come	about.
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discussion”	fixes	which	 taste	standard	 is	 relevant	 in	a	given	context.	
But	 there	 seem	 to	 be	 no	 relevant	 differences	 between	 NLtoL	 and	
LtoNL	when	 it	comes	 to	 the	question	under	discussion	at	 the	point	
where	participants	are	asked	to	assess	their	previous	taste	claims.
It	might	be	possible	 to	meet	 the	 indicated	challenges	 for	 contex-
tualism	and	relativism.	But	we	hope	to	have	made	a	prima facie	case	
that	these	positions	won’t	do.	This	further	motivates	hybrid	relativism.	
Of	course,	even	if	the	indicated	versions	of	contextualism	and	relativ-
ism	fail,	hybrid	relativism	isn’t	the	only	remaining	option.	For	instance,	
we	haven’t	discussed	expressivism	(Eriksson,	2016),	realism	(Schafer,	
2011)	or	genericity	accounts	(Moltmann,	2010;	Pearson,	2013).	It	might	
be	possible	 to	develop	an	 alternative	 account	of	 our	data	based	on	
these	views.	We	see	no	obvious	way	to	go	and	leave	a	thorough	inves-
tigation	for	another	occasion.
9. Conclusion
We	have	reported	a	novel	set	of	data	regarding	the	assessment	of	taste	
claims	after	a	change	in	taste	standards.	The	results	suggest,	first,	that	
people	have	no	clear	preference	on	whether	 such	claims	 should	be	
assessed	as	true	or	false.	Second,	whether	people	assess	them	as	true	
or	false	depends	on	the	direction	in	which	they	shift	their	taste	stan-
dard.	We	think	that	both	of	these	results	are	unexpected	and	hope	they	
will	inform	future	semantic	theorizing.	For	a	start,	we	have	suggested	
one	 strategy	 to	 accommodate	 the	 data,	 namely,	 an	 account	 that	 ap-
peals	to	hybrid	relativism.	On	this	view,	people	have	no	clear	prefer-
ence	regarding	the	truth-value	of	previous	taste	claims,	because	these	
claims	 are	 ambiguous	 between	 a	 relativist	 and	 a	 contextualist	 read-
ing.	The	direction	effect,	in	turn,	results	from	a	preference	for	negative	
interpretations.
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edly,	 the	worry	with	flexible	 contextualism	above).	However,	when	
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to	assess	their	previous	taste	claim	in	the	light	of	their	present	taste	
standard,	they	should	judge	it	as	false	(§2	and	§3).	If	they	choose	to	
assess	it	in	the	light	of	their	previous	taste	standard,	they	can	properly	
say	that	what	was	said	was	true.22
We	think	this	is	a	very	nice	account	of	the	even	split.	The	remain-
ing	 challenge,	 though,	 is	 to	make	 sense	of	 the	direction	 effect.	 The	
basic	 idea	would	presumably	have	 to	be	 that,	 in	NLtoL,	people	 are	
more	inclined	to	assess	their	previous	taste	claim	in	the	light	of	their	
present	taste	standard	than	in	LtoNL.	The	problem	is	that	there	is	no	
apparent	explanation	for	this	assumed	inclination	(see,	relatedly,	the	
worry	with	pragmatically	amended	versions	of	contextualism	above).	
Beddor	and	Egan	(2018),	for	instance,	suggest	that	the	“question	under	
22.	A	closely	related	proposal	would	be	that	‘was	true’	doesn’t	always	accord	with	
T1	and	T2	but	sometimes	expresses	a	property	more	along	the	lines	of	‘was	
correct’	as	used	in	the	assertion	norm	H3.	On	the	latter	reading,	participants	
should	say	that	the	initial	utterance	“was	true(=correct)”;	on	the	former,	they	
should	say	that	the	utterance	“was	true”	for	the	reasons	outlined	in	§2	and	§3.	
See	Kölbel	(2015a:	39–40)	and	Khoo	and	Phillips	(2019:	318–320)	for	related	
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